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The First Hundred Years of Mikhail Bakhtin by Caryl Emerson. Princeton
University Press, 1997. Pp. xvi + 296. $29.95.
The work of Mikhail Bakhtin has found its way into many theoretical
approaches, including feminism, cultural studies, and even the emerging field
of ecological literary criticism. Although it is doubtful that Bakhtin could have
anticipated such a wide ranging expropriation of his ideas, they nevertheless
seem applicable to an extraordinary variety of situations. This phenomenon
has taken place mainly in the West since the mid-1970s when Bakhtin's work
was translated, but as Caryl Emerson's enlightening new book clearly shows,
Bakhtin has also been many things to many readers in Russia, often in starkly contradictory terms. In examining the reception history of Bakhtin's work,
Emerson develops not only the contexts in which Bakhtin himself worked but
also the contexts through which Russian readers, from the publication of
Bakhtin's writings to the present, have developed their own perspectives on
Bakhtin. As Emerson sifts through these layers of context, she makes her readers aware of the remarkable history surrounding Bakhtin's ideas, providing an
important and necessary background that most Western readers of Bakhtin
lack. Emerson's book will prompt Western readers of Bakhtin to reevaluate
and, likely, deepen their understanding of the Russian thinker's work.
As Emerson begins her study, she focuses on the contrast between Russian
and Western perspectives on Bakhtin and notes the peculiarities of each. One
of the most important factors that keeps Western and Russian criticism in conflict is that Western criticism tends to focus heavily on power relations and
political issues, yet since the collapse of the highly politicized Soviet Union,
Russian critics have moved away from such issues, seeing them as misguided
and fruitless. This contrast is central to Emerson's study and, indeed, to the
future of Bakhtin studies in general because Bakhtin's work has little to do
with power relations. As Emerson points out, Bakhtin begins his search for
agency and personhood not with political consciousness but with the assumption that “genuine knowledge and enablement can begin only when my ‘I’
consults another ‘I’ and then returns to its own place, humbled and enhanced”
(26). The Western preoccupation with group identity, ironically nourished by
Bakhtinian notions of dialogic community, tends to obscure this individualizing aspect of Bakhtin, but while emphasis on individual consciousness is
attractive as an alternative to the excesses of cultural politics in Russia,
Emerson suggests that what may be needed there is not a Bakhtinian retreat
from politics but “a pragmatic working-out of responsible and differentiated
power relations” (26). While trends in the West tend to obscure some of
Bakhtin's most significant contributions, those very contributions may be
more of a distraction than a solution on Russian soil.
Emerson then turns her attention to Russian criticism of Bakhtin during his
lifetime, noting that while Bakhtin is currently seen as a liberal pluralist both
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in Russia and the West, his earlier critics saw his avoidance of communist
ideas as radical conservatism. During the Stalinist era, Bakhtin's work had a
cool reception partly owing to contemporary turf wars and Soviet political
restraints but also because it eccentrically went against the grain of contemporary scholarship. Early reviews of the Problems of Dostoevsky's Creative Art,
published in 1929, saw Bakhtin as “an idealist philosopher, an anti-Marxist
infected with pernicious Formalist habits” (88), and although the second edition of the Dostoevsky book, published as Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics in
1963, received similar criticism, it was no longer seen as dangerous. The
Creative Art of François Rabelais and Folk Culture of the Middle Ages and the
Renaissance (later translated as Rabelais and His World) was published after
Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics in 1965 but met with harsher criticism.
Although Bakhtin was by this time an approved Soviet author, the idea of “carnival laughter” was seen as “a good deal more dangerous and potentially anarchic than the dialogic word in the novel” (91). The dangerousness of this idea
to Russian critics can only be realized when the Western reader considers that
the Soviet literary climate of the mid-1960s was a “straitlaced, starchy, infinitely more cautious landscape” (93). Some critics even sought to temper this
idea by suggesting that it can only be persuasive within the context of Stalinist
oppression and terror. As Emerson puts it, “Under such conditions, a moment
of ‘liberation from fear’ is by itself, and by definition, creative” (100). Only
with the publication of Problems of Literature and Aesthetics in 1975 (later
translated as The Dialogic Imagination) did Russian critics begin to recognize
more fully the broader aspects of Bakhtin's thought: “The theoretical essays at
last make it clear that Bakhtin was not primarily an explicator of individual
literary worlds. He was a genre theorist who made use of individual writers to
explicate a larger thought” (115). The publication of this anthology accounted for some of the perceived eccentricity of Bakhtin's method, but these essays
would not have been possible during the Stalinist era. Instead, Bakhtin, like
many writers of his day, had to mask his ideas in what Emerson refers to as
“Aesopian language,” a hermeneutic device that allegorizes one's words in
multilayered, hidden subtexts to be decoded by the knowledgeable reader but
which also compounds the problem of explication. Bakhtin himself regretted
that, as he says, “I was forced to prevaricate, to dodge back and forth continually. I had to hold back all the time. The moment a thought got going, I had
to break it off” (qtd. in Emerson 129). Only with the relaxation of the political climate in Russia could Bakhtin's more overtly theoretical work, including
his earliest essays, like “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity,” as well as his
unpublished notes, be used to lift the mask of allegory.
Having taken the reader through the major critical trends during Bakhtin's
lifetime, Emerson devotes the second half of her book to recent criticism on
three major Bakhtinian themes—“polyphony” and “dialogism,” “carnival,”
and “outsideness.” While some of the criticism raises issues similar to those of
the earlier criticism, Russian scholars have had a better opportunity to evalu-
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ate Bakhtin's work in light of the full spectrum of his publications and without the full weight of political restrictions on them. Since Bakhtin's treatment
of polyphony and dialogism is exemplified through Dostoevsky's work, critics
question Bakhtin's reading of Dostoevsky, which not only avoids the actions
of characters and issues of plot but is also unconcerned with moral and ethical considerations, apparently missing Dostoevsky's point and suggesting that
polyphony and dialogism is not born out by Dostoevsky. Emerson notes,
however, that critics often develop this objection with a more traditional view
of dialogue in mind, focusing on face-to-face exchanges between individuals
rather than on the broader view, which Bakhtin developed through his awareness of Einstein's theory of relativity, that takes into account the much more
complex play of influences surrounding the exchange of words including the
microdialogues that take place within the individual as he or she attempts to
negotiate these many influences. While these microdialogues may indeed represent the torments of misguided characters, as in the case of Raskolnikov in
Crime and Punishment, they do emphasize the centrality of dialogue to
Bakhtin's, if not necessarily Dostoevsky's, theory of language. Bakhtin's notion
of carnival, moreover, has irked Russian scholars, who tend to view the idea
with suspicion because it has been so widely adopted by Western critics and
because it seems incompatible with polyphony and dialogism. Whereas dialogue individuates and functions most completely in the situation of the privately consumed novel, carnival absorbs and effaces the individual in the public square, “a place of monosyllabic obscenities and hawkers' cries, more suited to a Dionysian book burning than to sedate book reading” (167). But the
connection between the two concepts has been made by other Russian scholars through Bakhtinian outsideness, an idea that comes from the early writings but functions as an underpinning of his later writings. Outsideness
emphasizes the separation and independence of each individual that allows
for finalization and evaluation. Carnival, then, can be seen as a “metaphysics
of ‘laughing outsideness,’” whereby an individual, in a public and participatory setting, laughs at the absurdity of his or her own position, recognizes its
limitations, and invites others to orient him or her to the broader dialogic
framework. The concept of outsideness, developed fifty years before it
emerged after the publication of Bakhtin's major works, is, according to
Emerson, the crux of Bakhtin's argument and the cornerstone of his aesthetic
and ethical thinking.
In Emerson's opinion, the future of Bakhtin studies will make significant
contributions in the fields of pedagogy and literary theory and in a deepened
understanding of Bakhtin's own work as a theorist. Her book, which fills an
enormous gap by charting the history of Russian Bakhtin criticism for the
Western scholar, is an essential step in this direction. This history is necessarily complex, but Emerson renders it in a most readable and valuable way, by
putting into play the dialogue of competing voices responding to Bakhtin's
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word. She thus reaffirms a key aspect of Bakhtinian theory: that each individual comes to an already spoken word, responds to it in a spirit of creative
understanding, and in anticipating the responses of future others, opens a
space for others to participate in dialogue.
John H. Jones
Jacksonville State University

Unheroic Conduct: The Rise of Heterosexuality and the Invention of the Jewish Man
by Daniel Boyarin. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of
California Press, 1997. Pp. 395. $50.00 cloth; $18.95 paper.
Daniel Boyarin has always brought a personal agenda to his provocative
scholarly projects. In Carnal Israel: Reading Sex in Talmudic Culture (Berkeley,
1993), perhaps his most influential work, Boyarin set out not only to correct
what he believed to be prevalent misconceptions about the ideology of sexuality, gender, and the body in rabbinic culture, but also to promote a feminist
restructuring of sex and gender in traditional Judaism's present manifestations. In that volume, which occasionally became an apologia for some
aspects of the status and treatment of women in traditional Judaism, Boyarin
ended with the hope that his cultural critique had shown how contemporary
rabbinic Judaism might discover the internal resources with which to make
necessary social changes while preserving itself and its vitality. In Unheroic
Conduct Boyarin goes considerably further in projecting both personal and
political concerns into a supposedly historical study as he searches for corroboration of his thesis that rabbinic Judaism has always found a place for
what he identifies as his kind of “feminized” Jew, a male whose achievements
are intellectual rather than physical and whose sexual affinities are as much
homosocial, if not homoerotic, as heterosexual. In so doing, Boyarin seeks to
demonstrate that the cultural and religious tradition to which he is so strongly committed, and which he believes richly enhances the lives and identities
of many men and women, has always been accepting of people like him if
only it could be persuaded to know it.
Boyarin also describes his project as an act of political and cultural resistance since he believes that European Jewry have been subject to several centuries of “liberal” colonizing impulses which insisted that Jewish practices be
“reformed” to conform to liberal bourgeois principles. According to Boyarin's
reading of the past, Jewish “Enlighteners” like Sigmund Freud and Theodore
Herzl colluded in thinking that only an eradication of the “talmudic spirit”
could fit the Jews for civilization. He believes that through Jewish involvement
in modern movements, including psychoanalysis and Zionism, the “richness
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of Jewish life and difference has been largely lost.” Yet, while Boyarin sees the
modern Jewish abandonment of a “sissy heritage” as a noxious force in modern Jewish life, he also admits that the traditional culture itself not only
assumes a homophobic stance but also systematically excluded and continues
to exclude women from the practices the culture most highly regards, especially the study of Torah. Thus, his task in this volume is also to propose ways
to eliminate oppressive Orthodox Jewish practices and attitudes, particularly
those regarding women and homosexuals. He envisions the possibility of a
militant, feminist, nonhomophobic, traditionalist Orthodox Judaism and
insists that traditional Judaism can accommodate change and remain viable if
the terms of change can be seen as rooted in the documents, traditions, and
texts of the Rabbis. While Boyarin claims that to participate in this endeavor
is the calling of the scholar, those who read his book primarily in search of
scholarly method and insights may feel compelled to disagree; in attempting
to fulfil its utopian goals, Unheroic Conduct, full as it is of flashes of interpretive brilliance, more often reads like a polemical tract rather than a work of
history.
In the first half of Unheroic Conduct Boyarin presents a series of texts
intended to demonstrate that from the time of the Babylonian Talmud the
ideal model of masculinity in normative patterns of Jewish culture featured
men who were not aggressive, strong, or physically active. Within Ashkenazic
culture, rooted in the reality of Jewish political powerlessness, the soft man,
sexually and procreationally functioning but otherwise gendered as if female,
was the central and dominant cultural paradigm. While Boyarin does not
claim that this male model was valued exclusively or is more authentic than
others that are equally “Jewish,” he is quite unabashed in asserting not only
that this particular exemplar can be found in the texts, but also that he finds
it personally sympathetic and wishes to strengthen its presence and influence
in contemporary Jewish life.
This section of the book also attempts to account for why rabbinic culture
produced gentle, passive, emotional men at the same time as it formed a social
system based on subordinating women and keeping them separate from the
privileged spheres of study and communal worship. Boyarin denies the views
of scholars like myself who believe that such exclusions have to do with rabbinic convictions that women are essentially different from and lesser than
men in their natures or qualities. Nor does he accept that exclusion of women
can be explained by male perceptions of women as dangerous sources of both
sexual temptation and potential pollution. Rather, Boyarin explains this rigid
assignment of gender roles as a simple consequence of male desire for cultural control. Moreover, he argues that because non-Jewish cultures understood
studying Torah, the quintessential activity of rabbinic Jewish maleness, as
female, internalized ambivalence within Jewish culture itself is also responsi-
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ble for the extreme exclusion of women from male domains of worship and
study. Since the passive and studious men were already occupying women's
internal space, women had to be limited to crucial but culturally diminished
roles as family caretakers and economic entrepreneurs. Boyarin's insistence
that excluding women from the defining activities of traditional Jewish culture
is not an essential component of rabbinic Judaism but simply a sociological
development reflective of a particular time and place is an integral component
of his projected reformation of contemporary Orthodox Judaism, a system he
describes as still empowering men to make virtually all decisions about the
lives of women. Boyarin's sociological explanations and protestations, however, are not particularly convincing to this reader who is familiar with rabbinic
Judaism's deeply embedded convictions about women's essential alterity and
separateness from men.
The second half of Unheroic Conduct describes what Boyarin sees as Jewish
assimilationist efforts to undo the tradition of the effeminate Jewish male and
redefine gender roles to conform to European bourgeois models, especially in
late nineteenth century Vienna. Here, his focus is on Sigmund Freud and
Theodor Herzl, since he sees both psychoanalysis and Zionism as complicit in
processes of westernization which set aside traditional feminized Jewish male
paradigms for a vision of the “New Jewish Man” and the “Muscle Jew,” ideals
Boyarin sees as all but identical to contemporaneous glorifications of the
“Aryan” and the “Muscular Christian.” Thus, Boyarin represents Freud as panicked by late nineteenth-century anti-Semitic discourses which portrayed
Jews as feminized, pathic, and homosexual. He suggests that the Oedipal
complex was Freud's attempt to escape into gentile, phallic heterosexuality,
writing that “After the 1890s, no longer could a feminized male, father-desiring, pathic, hysterical Jewish queer be at the center of his thinking but an
active, phallic, mother-desiring, father-killing ‘normal’ man.”
Similarly, for Boyarin, Herzl's Zionism was another response to new models of the masculine, and he insists that Zionism represents a profound sort of
assimilationism in which Jews become like all the other nations and find manliness in having their own state. For Boyarin, who observes that this kind of
self-hatred characterized German-speaking Jews at the time when Herzl
founded political Zionism, it is clear that Freud's and Herzl's solutions to the
“Jewish problem,” are based on the repudiation of Jewish male “femininity.” A
corresponding consequence, as well, was the adoption by prosperous Western
and Central European Jewry of bourgeois norms for women which were
directed at transforming the active, robust, and entrepreneurial Jewish woman
into a passive and dependent “angel of the house.” Such formulations have
been made before, most recently by Paula E. Hyman in her excellent Gender
and Assimilation in Modern Jewish History: The Roles and Representations of
Women (1995), and they are unassailable. However, to place the onus for such
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complex social phenomena on two men alone, and to represent the purport
of their lives' work as little more than a rejection of traditional Jewish constuctions of a kinder, gentler masculinity in favor of acquiescence to European
colonization and Jewish assimilationism seems reductionist at best.
Boyarin's need to symbolically kill Freud and Herzl, two of the central
framers of contemporary Jewish discourse, and, indeed, of the modern condition in general, finds its ironic Oedipal conclusion in his embrace of Bertha
Pappenheim, the heroine of his final chapter, whom he describes as having
successfully diagnosed and resisted their projects. For Boyarin, Pappenheim,
known to many as Freud's patient, Anna O., survived psychoanalysis and
cured herself by leaving the malignant environment of Vienna for Frankfurt
where she became a social worker who devoted her considerable energies to
improving the condition of women both in and outside the Jewish community. He portrays the admirable Pappenheim as a positive model for Jewish
modernity because she remained an Orthodox Jew, rejecting both Jewish religious reform movements and Zionism while rebelling against the stifling
effects of bourgeois culture on women's propensities for action in the world.
Although Boyarin insists on Pappenheim's identification with Orthodox
Jewish practice and describes her as a radical reformer within that culture and
its institutions, he gives little evidence of this beyond her rejection of liberalizing Jewish alternatives and his portrayal of her German translations of
Yiddish literature identified with female readers as a feminist effort to preserve
evidence of women's spirituality alongside the all-male Hebrew tradition.
Rather he offers the circular argument that “If Pappenheim observed Jewish
tradition, as she clearly did, then she is Orthodox, and Orthodoxy has been
redefined by her feminist militance.” Similarly, his statement that there is
some justification for considering Pappenheim a foremother of lesbian separatist feminism is given little substantiation beyond Boyarin's assumption that
Pappenheim's choice to remain unmarried is proof of her same-sex orientation. Pappenheim receives Boyarin's particular approbation because he sees
her as identifying with traditional Jewish alternative gender models, both in
her own social activism and in her special interest in her seventeenth-century
relation, the businesswoman and memoirist Glikl of Hameln; in fact, however, Pappenheim's rejection of the traditional Jewish woman's role of entrepreneurial wife and mother seriously undercuts this notion.
Daniel Boyarin praises Bertha Pappenheim as a Jew who combined militant
feminine protest and demand for radical change within Judaism with a continued personal commitment to traditional Jewish practice, but he offers little
evidence that this was how Pappenheim indeed defined herself. Once again,
in this stimulating but infuriating volume, ideology takes precedence over a
convincing reading of the historical record. As Boyarin writes in conclusion,
he does not see this volume as a historical reconstruction of any actual past as
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much as a recovering of materials for an altogether new and different construction of a Jewish past and everyone's future. I would agree that building
imaginary pasts to serve the putative needs of an unforeseeable future is not
historical writing. The reader should have been warned before the final page.
Judith R. Baskin
State University of New York, Albany

Jewish Icons: Art and Society in Modern Europe by Richard I. Cohen. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1998. Pp. xviii + 358; 141 b/w illustrations
$50.00 cloth.
Richard Cohen's new study of Jewish icons begins appropriately with the
biblical injunction, “You shall not make for yourself a graven image, or any
likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath
. . . you shall not bow down to them or serve them” (Exodus 20:4).
Consciousness of the authority of the Second Commandment infuses the
book, though the author points out that Jewish exegesis of less conspicuous
biblical passages, usually drawn from outside the Pentateuch, often made that
authority far from absolute. Later parts of the Bible were periodically ransacked to provide a release from too literal a response to godly or Mosaic dictum. So, for instance, a passage from the Book of Isaiah—“and your eyes shall
see your teachers” (30:20)—became from the sixteenth century a fairly standard justification for allowing Jewish and gentile artists to create and then to
replicate images of well-known rabbinical figures.
Naturally, there were orthodox rabbis who took great exception or
absolutely refused to have their portraits made in any form. Knowing his strict
views, when followers in London of the Hakham Zevi Ashkenazi
(1660–1718) wanted his portrait, they surreptitiously arranged for it to be
painted while the rabbi remained in another room unaware of what was being
plotted. So excellent was the canvas (now in the Jewish Museum, London)
that when Rabbi Zevi's son first saw it several years later, he was completely
enthralled, marvelling that it seemed to bring his late father back to life (115).
Ironically perhaps, the portrait shows the Hakham pointing with his right
forefinger to a bookmark extending from a sacred text and containing the
Hebrew words for “God is one.” It is as if the unknown artist were acknowledging the sacrilegious nature of his act of disobedience by reminding us,
through the rabbi's gesture, of the sanctity of the Ten Commandments. More
cautiously, Cohen suggests that the gesture emphasizes the Hakham's rejection of “any other Jewish interpretation” and that it was a commonplace in
seventeenth-century Christian portraiture to show a religious leader pointing

Criticism Vol. 41 No. 1: Book Reviews

129

to a particular text (115–16). At the very least, it becomes evident from
Cohen's reexamination of the Hakham's portrait in the context of similar
works depicting Christian figures that Jewish iconography in early modern
Europe and later is in no small measure indebted to gentile influences.
The process of making an iconic figure out of an important rabbi leads
Professor Cohen to offer implicit—and sometimes explicit—comparison with
Christian hagiography. He sees it as “similar to the way individuals in
medieval or modern pilgrimages are motivated to walk away from a particular shrine with souvenirs or to create images that rekindle the memory and
reality of their experience” (122). In the Epilogue to his book, he reminds us
that “this phenomenon has not withered but only intensified in recent years”
(259), drawing our attention to the proliferation of images of the late
Lubavitcher rebbe, Menachem Schneerson (1902–1994). Because so many
publications of the Lubavitch sect that appeared during his lifetime were
graced with a photograph of the white bearded and benign figure of Rabbi
Schneerson, one can only surmise—perhaps wrongly—that he himself saw no
objection to such visual self-representation.
In an earlier age, as Richard Cohen shows very convincingly, the iconic
portrayal of a leading rabbinical figure would be deemed highly controversial,
as in the case of Rabbi Yehuda Aszod (1794–1866), “a commanding presence
in Hungarian Orthodoxy” (236) during much of the nineteenth century. The
hero worship of Aszod by his congregants led many to ascribe to him supernatural qualities. At his death, devotees persuaded the rabbis who came for
his funeral to allow his corpse, dressed in his finest Sabbath clothes, to be
propped up in a chair, in order that a photograph of this great spiritual leader
could be taken. In acquiescing to this, the rabbis were fully aware of their
revered mentor's known abhorrence of visual representation but were prepared to disregard this in favor of preserving his image. The photograph thus
taken was quickly copied for sale to his followers, the impressive receipts
proving invaluable (it was said by some) to pay for the marriage dowries of
his daughters. However, word had it that all those who had instigated the taking of the photograph “died within the year as retribution for their mistreatment of the dead” (137). Their fate may belong more to folk tradition than to
fact but the story illustrates well the continuing uneasiness in Jewish religious
thinking that accompanied breaking the Second Commandment in the name
of art.
Given its frequently anomalous status, how then should we define Jewish
art? The question is in many ways almost impossible to answer and, as a historian, Cohen's approach is at once circumspect and pragmatic. His main
position is that the study of Jewish art may be used to exemplify “the
increasing integration of Jews into European society” (5). As a consequence,
exploring Jewish art may be viewed simultaneously as reflecting “the mutuality of the unfolding relationship between Jew and Christian” (36) in early
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modern Europe. Such a position, as I think Cohen himself recognizes, raises
as many questions as it resolves. For instance, it must be evident that the
study of Jewish ritual or ceremonial art, represented by such objects as torah
shields and finials, menorahs, kettubot (marriage contracts) and mezzuzahs
(covered scrolls fixed to doorposts), is most valuable and informative for what
it tells us about the practice of Judaism itself. If to a greater or lesser extent
these objects as objects show the influence of techniques and forms that
derive from non-Jewish sources, that merely serves to illustrate the eclectic
nature of art. Their intrinsic interest as objects that reflect an ongoing discourse between Jew and Christian is negligible.
Cohen neatly sidesteps this particular issue by introducing two fascinating
chapters on the nineteenth- and twentieth-century mania among European
Jews of the haute bougeoisie to build up vast personal collections of Jewish ceremonial art. Many of these collectors appear to have been Jews who viewed
themselves as sufficiently assimilated with their gentile neighbors, but who
could identify most readily with their Jewish roots by amassing collections of
Judaica. If falling short of bowing down or serving graven images, these collectors “released lingering feelings of attachment and nostalgia, which allowed
. . . [them] to renew contact with a Jewish world otherwise so distant” (156).
But when ritual objects are detached from their original purpose by being
translated to the showcase for exhibition, they risk becoming little more than
fetishistic casualties. Witness the cultural vandalism associated with the heyday of collecting African art in the late nineteenth century. At least in the case
of Jewish ritual art, most—though not all—of the collectors retained more
than a vestigial reverence for their ancestry. It is an ultimate and terrible irony
that the largest of these collections was that assembled in Prague by officials
of the Nazi party for ideological and propagandist purposes as an epitaph to
the Jewish race. As Richard Cohen tells us, it was conceived as “a permanent
museum of Jewish art, from cradle to grave, that would be a constant
reminder to the world of the decadent nature of Jewish civilization” (202).
If translating Jewish ceremonial objects into “art” creates unsuspected difficulties and rattling loose ends, it would seem less problematic to examine
the work of artists who claim Jewish descent or whose work is infused with
Jewish themes. By judicious selection, Cohen shows how from the middle
years of the nineteenth century through to the cataclysm of the Holocaust,
“Jewish artists were to become important interpreters of contemporary Jewish
life” (255). For some readers, Cohen's choice of artists may seem idiosyncratic, particularly as several of them are less than well known, but each is well
employed to illustrate the multiplicity of ways in which Jews confronted problems of modernity in the pursuit of art. It is pleasing to encounter informed
discussions of such figures as Samuel Hirszenberg (1865–1908) and Maurycy
Minkowski (1881–1930), both important Polish artists of their day, whose

Criticism Vol. 41 No. 1: Book Reviews

131

work has all but disappeared from the public consciousness. Hirszenberg,
declares Cohen, “created works whose realism turned the momentary experience into a symbolic statement of the entire course of Jewish history” (223).
This observation is backed up by a largely helpful commentary on several of
his paintings, though Cohen omits any reference to the social realism of “The
Sabbath Rest” (Ben Uri Gallery, London), a canvas depicting an impoverished
Jewish family in a squalid urban tenement. The Ben Uri web page description
of this important painting gives far more prominence to the view from the
window, showing “an unwelcome industrial landscape,” and suggests that it is
“presumably threats of violence” that have kept the Jewish family indoors.
Cohen remains silent on this. However, his perceptive commentary on
Minkowski, whose work is “seldom exhibited or discussed today and hardly
accessible” (251), gives belated recognition to this fine artist.
Jewish Icons is an ambitious book that confidently crosses cultural boundaries in its pursuit of its main themes. As with other books out of the
University of California, it is extremely well produced, containing excellent
reproductions of well over a hundred images. (Occasionally, however, as in
the replication of “The Sabbath Rest,” part of a picture has been lopped off
without explanation.) If at times the reader is left uncertain as to the direction
its author will take, there is rarely a moment when he loses our attention in
mapping out his themes. When the celebrated nineteenth-century historian,
Heinrich Graetz, claimed that “paganism sees its god, Judaism hears him,” he
was reckoning without Richard Cohen's elegant reminder that, despite—or
maybe because of—the Second Commandment, Judaism has never been
absent of visual imagery.
Frank Felsenstein
Yeshiva University

The Visual and Verbal Sketch in British Romanticism by Richard C. Sha.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998. Pp. 277. $45.00.
In recent years a number of books have addressed the problematic role of
the visual and the visible in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
Such studies as Barbara Stafford's Body Criticism (1991) and William H.
Galperin's The Return of the Visible in British Romanticism (1993) have explored
the subject beyond the “sister arts” tradition so ably articulated by Jean
Hagstrum. At their best, these recent books confront the competing and often
contradictory values assigned to empirical perception. “We are led to believe
a Lie / When we see not through the Eye,” Blake enigmatically wrote. But what
does it mean to see “through” the eye? Sketching would seem to be a way to

132

Criticism Vol. 41 No. 1: Book Reviews

approximate the eye's rapid movements on paper and paradoxically to capture the natural perception in a more permanent form. The sketch is lodged
at the intersection of two elements of the visible: the immediate and the permanent. The conflict between immediacy and permanence resonates throughout Romanticism, perhaps most famously in the lifelike but lifeless figures on
Keats's Grecian Urn. The sketch, however, is far from Keats's polished vase: it
may seem more accessible, but it also must prove its aesthetic validity in order
to be seen and preserved.
At the end of his absorbing and highly readable study, Richard C. Sha has
amassed an impressive list of visual and verbal sketches published in the
United Kingdom between 1758 and 1850. This list alone would argue for the
importance of the sketch in British Romanticism. Such centrality in itself is
hardly surprising: in both literature and painting, Romanticism called into
question the neoclassical values of polish, decorum, genre, and even artistic
labor, preferring the “spontaneous overflow” of pen or paintbrush. In particular, as Sha puts it, the sketch “convinces audiences that less finish, less labor,
and less fastidiousness to form is more aesthetic, more truthful, or, in the case
of women artists, more proper” (1). In other words, sketching embodies a
conflict between authenticity and rhetoric. On the one hand, the sketch possesses a naturalness, a genuineness, and an immediacy that a polished work
of art can never have. Modest and unassuming, it gives the appearance of having no “palpable design” on its reader, as Keats would put it. Yet Sha finds a
“powerful rhetoric” in the “denied rhetoricity” of the sketch. The sketch, he
argues, persuades its viewer that “less is more.” “Less finish, polish, labor,
formality, and false learning make the sketch more artful” (17). Paradoxically,
therefore, by imposing an aesthetic code of its own, the sketch participates in
the very art(ifice) it denies.
Sha's first chapter examines attitudes toward the visual sketch in Britain
during the period, focusing on a series of binary categories for the sketch:
“either monumental or provisional, finished or unfinished, public or private,
expressively true or mimetically so” (28). These competing interpretations of
the sketch and sketching lead him to some definitions of class and (later in
the book) of gender. Sha begins by noting that the word sketch does not enter
the English language until 1687, and further suggests that, unlike the distinction between drawing and painting, the distinction offered by the “sketch”
depended on a shift in the notion of the artistic moment: “Only when it
becomes possible to envision art as occuring [sic] not so much on or after the
moment of completion, but more at original conception—the originating
idea—can drawing become valued for its own sake” (29).
Sha uses Constable's work to show how “sketchiness” as an evaluative term
could be either negative, suggesting vagueness and vulgarity, or positive,
implying genius and originality. He further exemplifies these two schools of
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thought through the arguments of Sir Joshua Reynolds and Rev. William
Gilpin. Sha suggests that Reynolds, as spokesman for the Royal Academy and
thus arbiter of British national taste, denigrated the sketch because the lack of
polish in the sketch would put the Academy out of business, not only as a
trainer of artists but as a commercial institution. Reynolds insisted on the
“labor” necessary to produce a work of art, but he took pains to dissociate this
mental, invisible labor from the physical labor of a workman, associating the
sketch with the latter, lower form. Finally, Reynolds distrusted the sketch
because it depended so much on the (untrained) viewer's imagination and
interpretation.
William Gilpin “enshrined” the sketch, Sha argues, for many of the same
reasons Reynolds objected to it. Gilpin celebrated the sketch's aesthetic merits as both mimetic and expressive, arguing that the sketch was “even more
natural than nature herself” insofar as the sketcher might correct some irregularities of landscape (54). Gilpin further argued for the intrinsic truthfulness
of the sketch, contrasting it to the “deceptiveness” of the oil painting. This
alleged truthfulness derived from the immediacy of the sketch's composition,
its “intimate connection to the landscape it renders” (56). Yet he complicated
the aesthetic, and blurred the boundary between the visual and the verbal, by
describing the sketch as a “translation” of nature, which is meaningless if it is
verbatim. Finally, Gilpin, unlike Reynolds, celebrated the lack of labor
required for the sketch and seemed not to mind that some of the labor is displaced onto the viewer, who must make a coherent image from the sketch.
Sha notes that for Gilpin and others, the sketch was an easy and harmless
way of “converting someone else's property into aesthetic property” (63) at a
time when physical acts of appropriation, such as war, colonization, and
enclosure, were having real and destructive effects. Hence he closes this first
chapter with a discussion of the sketch as appropriation. While conceding
that “no one is advocating real taking,” Sha argues that “this displacement
attenuates and contains the potential violence of appropriation” (67). Here, as
at several other points in the book, Sha slips a potentially compelling argument in through the back door, as it were, touching rapidly on a series of topics (plagiarism, colonialism, the gendered landscape) that merit more careful
examination. In general, Sha raises enough issues in this first chapter to make
a very different book, but his next three chapters will turn aside from questions of labor and property to concentrate on gender.
In the second chapter, Sha turns to the relation between sketching and
gender as the visual sketch became a “female accomplishment.” Many of his
points in this chapter are rather predictable: that women's sketches, unlike
men's, were not intended for later polish and completion; that sketching was
perceived as a moral and salutary occupation for the increasingly idle women
of the middle class; that, conversely, it might corrupt women of the lower class
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who would be tempted to rise above their station; and that, in general, the
moral encoding of women's sketches involved a conflation of the sketcher
with her subject (e.g., flowers). With this chapter, however, Sha is only setting
up his third and more provocative chapter, which argues that many women
used the verbal sketch as a means to question the code of feminine conduct
while at the same time “citing” that code to give themselves the appearance of
propriety (104). In other words, under the cover of the “sketch,” an unimpeachable feminine pursuit, such writers as Ann Batten Cristall, Hannah
More, Helen Maria Williams, and Sydney Owenson (Lady Morgan) challenged
conventional assumptions about the gendering of emotions and, in the case of
More and Morgan, advanced political opinions without overtly trespassing on
the masculine sphere. The sketch, in other words, became a coded language
that women could use to their advantage.
The fourth chapter turns back to the female visual sketch, this time as represented in the novels of Austen, Edgeworth, and the Brontës, all of whom
expose the contradictory expectations of the conduct book that women's
sketches should be private and yet that to be “accomplished” required some
display (145). On the one hand, Sha argues, Austen warns against the moral
danger of substituting “accomplishments” for real education. On the other,
she engages in serious debate about the gendering of aesthetics. By separating
moral from aesthetic issues, Austen opens up “an aesthetic space for women
beyond ideology” (151). Sha goes on to show how the novels of Charlotte and
Anne Brontë use the sketch to probe the power relations between the sexes:
women sketch in private so as to avoid the immodesty of public display, yet
their sketching is a currency of their value that must be scrutinized, evaluated, and supervised by men: men who persistently question their validity and
originality.
Sha's final chapter examines Wordsworth's Descriptive Sketches and Byron's
Childe Harold's Pilgrimage as examples of “how male Romantic writers used
poetic sketches to signal their consciousness of the limits of monuments and
monumentality” (163). Though his account is brief, Sha offers an alternative
to the deconstructive work of such critics as Hartmann and de Man on the
rhetorical power of the monument and its epitaphic inscriptions. Sha does not
quite make clear, however, the relationship between the Romantics' acknowledgment of the materiality of language and their embrace of the sketch as a
fluid medium. His discussion of Wordsworth and Byron touches on such
important issues as political tyranny and self-representation, but many readers will wish he had extended this discussion further. The book ends without
a real conclusion: as Sha notes that “the monument marks the sketch's grave,”
the book itself seems to lose its fluid exploration in the face of the monumental Romantic canon.
With their appetites thus whetted, other readers may wish, as I did, for
fuller discussion of the implications of sketching among the male Romantic
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poets: Blake comes first to mind. But perhaps Sha does us a greater service in
highlighting the lesser-known sketches and sketchers, leaving us to consider
how the culture of sketching affected the works we know better. My minor
complaints about the book only testify to its overall success in calling attention to the slipperiness of Romantic sketching. In a way, the book embodies
some of its own concerns, as the middle section on gender seems much more
solid and polished and the flanking chapters more “sketchy.” I hope that Sha's
work will pave the way for further discussion of the Romantic sketch, especially as it impinges on notions of revision and canonicity among male as well
as female writers.
Jennifer Davis Michael
The University of the South

Robert Burns and Cultural Authority edited by Robert Crawford. Iowa City:
University of Iowa Press, 1997. Pp. 242. $29.95.
Nineteen ninety-six saw the commemoration of the bicentenary of Robert
Burns's death; it also marked a burgeoning renewal of interest in the Scottish
poet. Robert Crawford's Robert Burns and Cultural Authority joins Kenneth
Simpson's collection of essays, Burns Now (1994), Ian McIntyre's biography,
Dirt and Deity: A Life of Robert Burns (1995), and numerous other works seeking not just to reconfirm but to reassess “the Immortal Memory.” The essays
in Robert Burns and Cultural Authority, derived from a series of lectures which
Crawford organized at the University of St. Andrews in 1996, concern themselves both with the many ways in which Burns confronted eighteenth-century cultural authority and with his subsequent establishment as a cultural
authority in his own right. Attempting to move beyond the walls of academia
and to indicate “the continuing way in which Burns's work provides cultural
nourishment” (xi), the collection includes contributions from writers of poetry and fiction as well as literary critics: an ambitious goal, but one which, for
the most part, succeeds. (A poet himself, Crawford serves as an admirable
example of one who crosses over into several camps.)
Crawford begins the collection with a compelling essay on “Robert
Fergusson's Robert Burns,” in which he emphasizes the importance of the earlier poet's work to Burns's own cultural project. Fergusson, as Crawford suggests, provided Burns with an example of how to combine “solemnity and
daftness” (3) in a verse form that would adequately convey that “odd tonal
mix” (4): Standard Habbie. At the same time, in his commemoration of and
identification with Fergusson (who “died pining in an Edinburgh madhouse
at the age of 24” [7]), Burns exposes “the failure of Edinburgh's great and
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proud patrons to nurture native, vernacular talent” (7). Fergusson thus served
Burns both as model and as a haunting foreshadowing of his own potential
fate. Crawford moves from the fraternal link between the two poets to focus
on eighteenth-century Scottish fraternities: the all-male clubs (including, but
not limited to, the Freemasons) which, he argues, influenced the work and
sensibility of both Fergusson and Burns. According to Crawford, these clubs
“functioned as part of the articulation of eighteenth-century Scottish masculinity through their rituals and use of literary texts, drink, male bonding
and initiations” (8). Crawford's examination of Burns's work in relation to
these clubs provides a valuable reassessment of Burns's vernacular.
A. L. Kennedy's “Love Composition: The Solitary Vice” continues the
examination of gender in the work of Burns, but in a much more problematic fashion. Kennedy describes her experience in a local English Burns club
where, as “a young and delicate lady caught in the company of older, expatriate Scots” (23), she came face to face with the connection between “Burns and
sex” (24) in the form of the club's large mural of Tam O'Shanter and a scantily clad Nannie. Rather than pursue the connection between the erotic and the
condition of the expatriate (which Crawford might perceive as a form of contemporary homosocial bonding), Kennedy chooses to examine “the harnessing and channeling of sexual energy for literary ends and the relationship
between Burns's use of sex in his work and in his life” (24). According to
Kennedy, writing provided Burns with, progressively, “socially acceptable
expressions of lust” (25), a space to explore the “interior conflict” (26)
between love and death, an effective means of “seducing a farmer's daughter”
(29), and, in the case of the more socially elevated women to whom he wrote,
a way of eliciting help towards better poetic performances. While Kennedy's
easy equation of sexual experience and writing begs many questions—couldn't a celibate poet write with just as much energy as one who experienced frequent sexual gratification?—the most disturbing aspect of this essay is the way
it reiterates the moral attitude to Burns voiced by commentators soon after his
death, an attitude used both to condemn and to coyly elevate him in the present day: in Kennedy's words, “a more chaste Burns would quite possibly have
lived longer” (27).
Also on the topic of gender, Kirsteen McCue's “Burns, Women and Song”
sets out “to examine briefly the work of a small number of Burns's fellow
women writers who were equally fascinated by this literary and musical medium, and to determine the similarities between several of their songs and those
of Burns” (41). McCue focuses on the interaction between Burns and three
women: Jean Glover, Isobel Pagan and Carolina Oliphant. The case of Glover,
a laboring-class woman, illustrates how Burns was influenced by the performances of women singers. The cases of the other two women demonstrate the
indeterminacy surrounding claims to first publication of popular songs.
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Although Burns declared himself to have been the first to bring “Ca' the
Yowes” to the printed page, later scholarship also attributes the song's publication to Isobel Pagan, another “peasant poet” in the area. Similar controversy surrounds “The Land o' the Leal,” which was attributed to Burns but is now
recognized as the work of Carolina Oliphant, Lady (or Baroness) Nairne.
McCue's essay is valuable in addressing Burns's songs, which scholars have
been reluctant to discuss, and in bringing to light the existence of female
song-makers, who, according to McCue made up 30 percent of the song-publishing population in Scotland at the time. But McCue's essay opens up as
many questions as she answers. In particular, given that the essay specifically
aims to draw our attention to Burns's “fellow women writers,” the reader may
wonder further about the link between gender, song, and the development of
national culture. In particular, McCue hints at a significant feminization of the
nation, suggesting that “many song collections were produced specifically
with young women in mind” (43) and, quoting Charles Rogers, that Lady
Nairne was seen as “a noble coadjutor and successor to [Burns] in renovating
the national minstrelsy” (46).
Douglas Dunn's “‘A Very Scottish Kind of Dash’: Burns's Native Metric”
borrows the term “metric” from T. S. Eliot's Ezra Pound: His Metric and Poetry
in order to examine not just versification but “the poet's entire system of resonance, his acoustic and voice” (58). Dunn makes the very valid point that the
term “artistry” is rarely applied to Burns because of his continued reputation
as the most popular of popular poets. In this essay, Dunn begins by focusing
on Burns's “self-controlled myth” of nonartistry, then shifts to an examination
of Burns's use of particular stanza forms, almost all of which “have an ancestral root in Scottish poetic tradition” (60). Dunn's attention to the mechanics
of Burns's poetry is a welcome addition to the corpus of Burns criticism.
Marilyn Butler's “Burns and Politics” provides an impressive and comprehensive overview of the many different kinds of politics in Burns's work. She
examines the overt political works—those which include direct references to
“current events and public personalities,” but she also considers the less overtly political works—Jacobite songs, poems about church politics and Burns's
use of the vernacular in his poetry (here she displays the same kind of interest as Dunn in the resonances of poetic form). Butler's Burns is foremost a
political animal, and an informed and unwavering political animal at that.
Butler rejects the view that Burns displays “uncertain loyalties” in his poetry,
preferring to read the Burns of 1793 as conscious that he was “an unmistakable partisan of reform” (97). Butler interprets Burns's move to song
publication and collection as an attempt to escape censorship, suggesting the
importance of particular tunes in conveying political messages while evading
the disapproval of government authorities. The most important issue Butler
raises in this essay is Burns's relevance to the recent critical project to reassess
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the definition of “Romanticism.” According to Butler Burns's song collection
marks for him a place in a “decentered, localised British Romanticism” which
is “genuinely popular in its verse-forms, social origins and ideal audience”
(111). Butler's comment that Burns is “the first of our cultural nationalists,
though his brilliantly-imagined construction of modern Scotland” (111) bears
further consideration, however (if only because of the ambiguity of the possessive “our”). It might be fairer to say, given the vastly different interpretations of the poet and his nation that have resulted from reading his work, that
Burns constructed multiple Scotlands, indeed, multiple Britains.
Susan Manning's “Burns and God” looks at Burns's negotiation with the
cultural authority of the Scottish Kirk. Burns adopted the persona of Satan,
but, according to Manning, this was not just “a calculated offense to cultural
authority in all its forms”; rather it was “a self-conception which seemed to
stimulate his language into liberating virtuosity” (115). (In a paradoxical twist,
Manning suggests that Burns's revolutionary spirit made him “more Calvinist
than the Kirk” which had by Burns's day “ossified into a new theological
orthodoxy” [115].) However, while “Burns's greatest religious poetry was fabricated from the theological positions which he most despised,” “he had no
imaginative language in which to write directly of his beliefs” (126). A “‘positive’ religious vernacular” (127) was not available to him. Manning suggests
that it was this impasse that in part motivated Burns's turn to songs, where he
found a positive vocabulary that evaded Kirk discourse.
Carol McGuirk's “Haunted by Authority: Nineteenth-Century American
Constructions of Robert Burns and Scotland” concentrates on the transatlantic
Burns. McGuirk finds evidence for two different versions of Burns. The official Burns, a “Major Dead Briton,” was constructed by leading American writers such as Emerson, Hawthorne, Longfellow, and Whitman. Their constructions were, however, carefully calculated to promote their own conceptions of
America. Interestingly, McGuirk suggests that, while American writers
admired Burns's representation of the local, Burns was seen primarily not as
a Scottish but as a British poet, and so was associated with the dominant culture from which American writers were attempting to free themselves.
Longfellow's poem, “Robert Burns,” which attempts to combine Standard
Habbie form with Standard English vocabulary, stands out as an especially
curious example of the ambiguous interpretations of Burns that occurred on
the other side of the Atlantic. According to McGuirk, however, in addition to
the Burns constructed by American litterati, an unofficial Burns also entered
American popular mythology, sometimes anonymously, through the songs.
In “Authenticating Robert Burns,” Nicholas Roe explores the paradox that
has characterized Burns criticism since the early reviews of his work: his cultural authority depends on his obscure origins, yet those origins have to be
clearly proved in order to legitimately claim him as a “Scottish bard.” Roe
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adroitly examines critical opinions that seek to link Burns's native genius with
his nativity. Arguing that in nineteenth-century commentary, Burns's obscurity became associated with both Romantic sublimity and self-destructiveness,
Roe also maintains that Burns himself provided his readers with a self-representation that ultimately preempted the power of any such pronouncements
on his character.
While Roe concentrates primarily on Romantic appropriations of Burns,
Andrew Nash offers an analysis of the recruitment of Burns into the later nineteenth-century Kailyard ideology. Such a recruitment was made possible by
contemporary perceptions of literature as a mimetic document of Scottish life.
According to John Wilson and others, Burns accurately recorded the simple
life of the Scottish peasantry. According to Nash, later nineteenth-century
Burns clubs, biographical essays in editions of Burns's poetry and textual
apparata found in song collections “froze” Scottish literature and Scottish
identity “at a time when it was perceived as moving into a stage of irreparable
transition” (189). It was only a short step to Burns being perceived as
“Scotland personified” (189).
It was in direct repudiation of such representations of Burns as the voice of
the rural peasantry and of Scotland that Hugh MacDiarmid (C. M. Grieve)
established his own anti-Burnsian campaign, attempting to move Scottish literature beyond the Kailyard into the modernism of the twentieth century. In
“MacDiarmid's Burns,” Alan Riach takes the reader through the many contradictions in MacDiarmid's struggle with Burns's cultural authority. MacDiarmid
produced hundreds of articles for Scottish newspapers and journals denouncing Burns and the Burns cult, while at the same time, as Riach points out,
drawing on and alluding to Burns's work in his own work, for example in A
Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle (1926). In a similarly paradoxical vein,
MacDiarmid claimed that Burns had no lasting literary value in European literature while capitalizing on Burns's popularity, particularly in Eastern
European countries, in order to travel and to deliver international lectures on
Burns.
Finally, in “Burns's Art Speech,” Seamus Heaney draws on his personal
impressions to exuberantly discuss both the “speech” and the “art” of Burns's
poetry. Such poems as “To a Mouse,” Heaney suggests, demonstrate Burns's
capacity to offer “asylum to all vernacular comers” (218). At the same time,
however, he acknowledges that much of Burns's poetic power comes from his
“merging of Ayrshire Scots and literary Scots with an English that is variously
Scots or Standard in its colouring” (225). Heaney's own poetic concern—to
use poetry to “intimate the possibility of some new intercourse and alignment
among the cultural and political heritages” of different languages in Ireland—
seems at the forefront of his reading of Burns. Whereas Dunn points out evidence of Burns's Scottishness in the metrics of his poetry, Heaney emphasizes
the multiple languages of Burns's work to make his case that Burns is not just
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a local but a “world poet” (225). Nevertheless, both Dunn and Heaney share
a belief that Burns's poetry indicates that “the ‘margin’ is not ‘marginal’ at all”
(Dunn 80), that it can be used “to take cultural authority back to the local
ground and to reverse the colonising process by making the underprivileged
language of the native the normative standard” (Heaney 221).
Detailing the various contradictory positions that critics have taken on
Burns's religious attitudes, Susan Manning remarks in her essay that “the
‘Burns’ so described probably reflects nothing so much as the beliefs of the
describer” (118). One could say the same thing of each of the essays in this
collection, as different, sometimes conflicting Burnses are brought to light
throughout the volume. What is notable, however, is the level of critical
engagement. Whereas much critical ink has been spilt proving Burns's status
as a “great poet” according to canonical standards, the essays here examine
Burns on his own terms as both a serious writer and as a cultural icon. The
issue, then is not how Burns does or doesn't fit in with the standard canon of
British literature, but how the study of Burns can alter our conception of
canonicity and of what counts as literature. Here is a collective endeavor to
look at the whole of Burns's work, including the songs, whose importance has
been largely minimized by literary critics. For Crawford, the songs are evidence of the kind of masculinist culture that shaped Burns's sensibility. For
Butler, they are further evidence of Burns's political activity. For Manning,
they offered Burns a revolutionary spiritual vernacular, while for McGuirk the
songs provided a means of smuggling an unofficial Burns across the Atlantic.
What seems to characterize this collection of essays as well is a desire to
move away from the easy identification of Burns as “Scotland personified”
(189) as Andrew Nash puts it in his essay. Instead we see the complications in
that image. Nicholas Roe hints at this aspect of the project when he quotes
Keats on Burns: “The Genius of Poetry must work out its own salvation in a
man. . . . That which is creative must create itself” (176). Roe concludes, “If
this was true of Scotland's ‘own inspired Bard’, it also remains true for the ‘wellknown Land’” (176). As well as providing a welcome addition to the critical
understanding of a figure who has been undervalued in literary scholarship,
Burns and Cultural Authority also speaks to the condition of a Scotland busy
trying to negotiate a new relationship with the political authority of Great
Britain.
This is the best collection of essays on Burns to be published to date. A
condensed excursion into the cultural politics of marginality, the twelve essays
cross between disciplines, centuries, and continents not so much to reveal the
“true” identity of the man, whatever that may be, but rather to suggest the
multiple contexts in which Burns has been and will continue to be read and
re-read.
Leith Davis
Simon Fraser University
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William Blake in a Newtonian World: Essays on Literature as Art and Science by
Stuart Peterfreund. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998. Pp. xv +
255; 8 illus. $34.95.
Locke and Blake: A Conversation across the Eighteenth Century by Wayne
Glausser. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998. Pp. xi + 201. $49.95.
Until quite recently, it was a truth universally acknowledged that Blake—
as poet, artist, thinker, and publisher—was a historical anomaly, a visionary
whose work transcended the beliefs of his time. Although he is classified as a
Romantic poet, his work is notoriously difficult to assimilate with his contemporaries’. And though he lived most of his life in the eighteenth century,
his radical poetics could not be more alien to that period's dominant concerns
or its prevailing style. Beyond traditional disciplines as well as periods, Blake
consciously defied the conventions of his culture, nowhere more so than in
the production of his books, which he meticulously engineered one at a time.
Both works under review set out to challenge this portrait and to situate
Blake within the cultural and political context of what Glausser calls “the long
eighteenth century” (1660–1830). More importantly, they seek to engage
Blake in a series of fruitful conversations with the pressing topics of his day,
from slavery to Gnosticism. Even as they differ markedly in style and method
of argument, both books attempt to overturn Harold Bloom's theory of poetic influence, his emphasis on the charged agon of the Freudian psychodrama.
Rather than defeat his interlocutors, as both critics show, Blake means to persuade and ultimately redeem them. As they appear in his work, figures like
Locke, Bacon, Milton, and Newton are less bogies to be resisted and vanquished than specters ready for “rehabilitation.” Glausser's book is more
emphatic in this regard, working against the grain not only by setting Blake
and Locke in direct dialogue, but also by searching out points of agreement
rather than contention. Glausser endeavors “to discover more complicated
patterns of comparison” (ix), a task that leads him to experiment with a new
hermeneutic model, what he calls “a composite critical biography” (ix).
Although he deploys the more orthodox form of the critical essay, Peterfreund
similarly works to implicate Blake in the scientific, religious, and cultural
debates of his time. His study examines the extent to which Blake's reaction
to his predecessors is “based on an informed understanding of Enlightenment
premises in general and Newtonian thought in particular” (xii).
Peterfreund begins his book by defining “situated knowledge”—knowledge that is cognizant of its own ontology, its existence as part of an ongoing
historical narrative—which he sets in opposition to a universalizing epistemology he calls “scientific” (4) that insists on “dissituation” (9). Among those
rationalists who embrace an ahistorical “knowledge ‘in itself’” (15) are
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Montesquieu, Voltaire, Hume, Gibbon and, of course, Newton. Included in
those thinkers who espouse what Clifford Geertz calls “local knowledge” are
Leibniz, Vico, Herder, and Blake, whose “locolalia” (16) or obsession with lists
of the actual reveals his belief in the primacy of situated knowledge.
Peterfreund argues that above all “what situated knowledge foregrounds and
celebrates . . . is the deployment of metaphor in the act of invention” (17), a
characteristic Blake borrows from the prophetic discourses of Jesus in the
Gospels.
The first two chapters examine Blake's response to Newton's Principia,
especially in the later prophetic works, where characters like Urizen, Los, and
Enitharmon variously adopt and struggle with Newtonian roles. In skillful
close readings of passages from Jerusalem and Milton, Peterfreund shows how
Blake corrects Newton's model of the universe, replacing the “outward” with
the “inward” gaze. The middle chapters analyze Blake's complicated negotiations with the Freemason and Gnostic movements and explore Blake's treatment of charters, weights, and measures as forms of social control. In chapter
3, “Blake, Freemasonry, and the Builder's Task,” we learn that “Blake's animosity to some practitioners of Freemasonry does not necessarily imply his
rejection of Freemasonry itself” (60), a point driven home in Peterfreund's
useful analysis of a number of Blake engravings which borrow visual motifs
from Masonic aprons and ornaments. The fourth chapter, “Blake, Priestley,
and the ‘Gnostic Moment’” traces the revival of gnosticism in eighteenth-century England and the importance of this dissenting movement in shaping
Priestley's scientific theories as well as Blake's “immanentist metaphysics”
(94). Chapter 5, “Blake on Charters, Weights, and Measures,” is the most New
Historicist of the essays, focusing on the increasing authority of measurement
and standardization in the 1790s and the effect of this new dispensation on
the language of “London.”
The final three chapters outline Blake's critique of Newtonian metonymic
logic, Natural Theology, and the ideology of Nature respectively and chart
what happens to Blake's language in the new urban landscape (“The Din of
the City”). These chapters include a persuasive and original reading of the
questions in “The Tyger” as metonymic rather than metaphorical (or rhetorical), as attempts “to mobilize the logic of effectus pro causa to reason back from
the tiger as created effect to an understanding of his creative first cause” (127);
a discussion of Blake's spiritual ideology, which “ordains a transferential and
metaphorical relationship between causal subject and caused object . . . maintaining both in a state of (re)constitutive play” (141); and a thoughtful analysis of cacophony in Blake's prophetic books.
Peterfreund's essays offer a wide-ranging and learned discussion of important topics, but they never cohere as a book, as a sustained, capably developed
meditation on Blake's relationship to eighteenth-century science and culture.
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The author has added a preface and introduction, but all of the major chapters have been reprinted, two from as long ago as the early 1980s. No effort,
as far as I can tell, has been made to refashion the essays into a more cohesive
sequence or provide clarifying transitions between chapters. On the contrary,
each essay begins anew, with the result that there is overlap and repetition, but
no development. It is the patient reader indeed who will leave this work without feeling that the author has neglected “the builder's task” of supplying a
sturdy framework for his ambitious design. A myriad proofreading errors (at
least two dozen), the absence of a bibliography, and the fact that key terms
like “transferential,” “immanentist,” and “ideology” are not fully defined until
the later chapters only increases the reader's burden.
Of greater concern, perhaps, is the explicit identification with and endorsement of Blake's perspective, especially in a collection that is so careful to warn
against the totalizing claims of scientific rhetoric. Rather than enacting a genuine conversation—as Glausser attempts to do—Peterfreund establishes a
binary that privileges the “intuitive rightness” (48) of Blake's philosophy over
the benighted materialist project of Newton. Again and again, the “immanent,
immaterial principle” (56) of Blake's writings triumphs over the deluded
materialism of Newton, whose world is a “heavy” mess of matter, motion, and
force and whose theories and language are never adequately examined or
complicated. The prevalence of references to the Bible—from Genesis, the
Gospels, and Paul especially—far outweighs the discussions of science
(which, in any case, is figured only in terms of its rhetorical dimension) and
indicates the author's own spiritualist proclivities.
In Locke and Blake, Glausser tries to be more fair-minded, examining his
subjects “with equal attention and critical distance” (x). To do so he dispenses with the standard critical essay format and creates an eclectic critical biography organized by specific cultural topics. A series of “correspondences” or
“convergences” in the lives of his subjects allows Glausser to bring the two
together in unexpected ways. For example, both men had run-ins with bishops and with the law (Blake was brought to trial for sedition; Locke's name
was included on a 1685 list of seditious radicals); both sought alternatives to
ordinary marriage; both had complex and ambivalent responses to the slave
trade; both quarreled over “stolen” pictures; and both composed epitaphs that
lamented the meaninglessness of earthly life. The biographical parallels are
sometimes thin, however, and Glausser is on safer ground when he widens the
discussion to include overlapping topics, such as medicine, property, and
printing.
Chapters 4 and 7, on slavery and printing, are the strongest and most compellingly argued of the book. Chapter 4 examines both men's ambivalence
toward slavery. Locke is clearly the more complex and difficult case, and
Glausser sets forth the circumstances surrounding his involvement in the
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slave trade with admirable clarity. After summarizing scholarly interpretations
of Locke's personal and theoretical associations with slavery, Glausser concludes that “Locke the opponent of slavery cannot entirely suppress Locke the
Landgrave” and that because of the “many confusions of theory and practice”
(70) Locke cannot avoid writing “himself into the histories of both slavery and
abolition” (75).
Blake was more demonstrably abolitionist, but Glausser nonetheless
describes “some fault lines” (76) running through his antislavery texts and
images. The first appears in his collaboration with John Stedman in engraving
designs for Stedman's Narrative of an Expedition against the Revolted Negroes of
Surinam. On the surface an antislavery text, Stedman's narrative in fact ends
up defending an “enlightened” type of slavery practiced by humane owners
(77) and “implies a theory of white skin as primary” (79). Although, as
Glausser admits, “it is difficult to distinguish [the engraver's] authorship within a collaborative text” (81), Blake is all but convicted of guilt by association.
In his own work, Blake's imagery is seen to participate in his culture's “pejorative figuration of black” (83), most notoriously in a troubling parenthetical
reference that appears in “Song of Liberty”: “O African! Black African! (go
winged thought widen his forehead)”. In “The Little Black Boy” as well,
Glausser finds that the poem's narrator “is actually enslaved by the universalist transcendence designed to liberate him” (91). If there is a tendency here to
regret the fact that Blake was not as modern or liberal-minded “as one might
have hoped” (91), in other words not as sensitive to these issues as we are,
there is also a welcome attention to the nuances of Blake's specific language
and the iconography of his images.
In Chapter 7, “Printing,” Glausser explores the substantive ways in which
“print consciousness” (141) influenced his subjects' dominant ideas. While
Locke immerses himself in print culture—and becomes so affected by it that
he uses print as a constitutive metaphor in defining the operations of the
mind—Blake revolts against it, both in explicit thematic arguments and in his
use of expressive media (illuminated printing). In itself this is not a startlingly new idea, but Glausser goes on to uncover “shadowy subplots” (156) within both authors' thinking about print which work against their surface claims.
For the rationalist Locke this involves a suspicion in the Essay Concerning
Human Understanding that imprinted images are “idols, somehow deficient in
spiritual content” and a nostalgic desire “for inspiration” (153). More interesting still are a number of biblical echoes in the Essay's argument, echoes that
show that “Locke's printed ideas occasionally fall into association with shadows, eidola, idols and may call up just the faintest shudder of spiritual death”
(156). For the visionary Blake, the counterplot turns on “the danger of excessive spirituality” (157), a claim that is teased out in a tantalizingly brief close
reading of “The Crystal Cabinet.” Here Glausser uncovers Blake's reservations
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about imagination and enthusiasm, his need to limit or restrain the voice of
private inspiration.
A note at the end of Locke and Blake informs us that the author has received
several awards for teaching and was chosen “Indiana Professor of the Year” in
1990. This no doubt accounts for the book's lucid exposition, its clear presentation and summary of arguments, and its jargon-free prose. If its claims
are not always earth-shatteringly original, they have the virtue of being presented concisely and accessibly. Any reasonably intelligent undergraduate
would have little trouble negotiating the pages of this book, some of which are
also highly entertaining (see, for example, Locke's forays into medicine, his
interest in Lycanthropy, and his fortuitous operation on Lord Ashley Cooper
[43–53]). In my mind this clarity enhances rather than diminishes the value
of Glausser's achievement, though it cannot compensate for the book's lack of
illustrations, a sin in any study of Blake and a serious shortcoming in the slavery chapter, where several designs are searchingly analyzed but remain
unavailable for our immediate inspection.
Other weaknesses include a tendency to mix the personal with the published views of the authors (overstressed in Glausser's speculations about
Blake's credibility in the Scofield affair) and the book's somewhat outdated
bibliography. A reckoning with two important new studies of Locke, Barbara
Arneil's John Locke and America: The Defense of English Colonialism (Oxford,
1996) and Nicholas Wolterstorff's John Locke and the Ethics of Belief
(Cambridge, 1996) might have strengthened the book's assertions. Chapter 4
especially would have benefited from New Historicist work on the slave trade
and recent essays by critics like Alan Richardson and Anthony Harding on
“The Little Black Boy.” In the main, though, Glausser's study offers a useful
corrective to the rote polarizing of Locke and Blake to which we have become
accustomed, placing the authors in fruitful dialogue, and staking a convincing claim that they belong together in the long eighteenth century. Although
at times uneven in presentation, both books will be welcomed by Blake scholars looking to situate the poet more firmly in his own time.
Grant Scott
Muhlenberg College
Blake's Nostos: Fragmentation and Nondualism in ‘The Four Zoas’ by Kathryn S.
Freeman. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997. Pp. ix + 208.
$49.50 cloth; $16.95 paper.
Nostos is Greek for the homecoming of the heroes from Troy, and in Blake's
Nostos: Fragmentation and Nondualism in ‘The Four Zoas,’ Kathryn S. Freeman
adapts the term to mean the “homecoming as a return to wholeness” (159) of
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consciousness itself. To explain this homecoming, Freeman addresses the
question of how Blake can offer an alternative to the fallen state of dualism
without himself falling into the dualism against which he struggles. Freeman's
answer is that in Blake's apocalypse the dualism of the fallen world is subsumed by “nondualism,” rather than being dialectically opposed to it. “Blake
does more,” Freeman says, “than invert conventional duality; he calls the
notion of duality itself into question” (2). Blake's apocalypse, according to
Freeman, “is a state that expands the universe, destroying not people, nature,
time, or history, but the illusion of otherness,” and she adds that it is this
“unhesitating dissolution of boundary lines” that “distinguishes Blake from
the poets of the high romantic sublime, who tentatively probe nonduality but
ultimately retreat to the familiar ground of their separate existence” (4–5). In
Freeman's analysis, Blake attempts to dissolve this sense of separate existence
so that the reunified consciousness itself can emerge as the hero of The Four
Zoas.
Freeman's discussion hinges on her answer to what she calls the “greatest
structural riddle of the poem,” the relationship between “the affirmation of
Night the Ninth and the chaos that precedes it” (40). The attempt to explain
this relationship, Freeman argues, has led to “linear or dialectical descriptions
of the poem's movement”; in place of such descriptions she proposes a “proleptic” and “metaleptic” approach, in which “Night the First through Night the
Eighth gain meaning through the revelation of Night the Ninth, which in turn
is achieved through the experience of the first eight Nights” (40). Using as a
model the Jungian notion of the “centricity of the archetypal mandala,”
Freeman attempts to “[visualize] Night the Ninth as the center rather than the
ending of the poem” (45), and this effort informs the book's overall structure.
After tracing Vala's prototype in the character of Lyca from Blake's “Little Girl
Lost” and “Little Girl Found” poems, and introducing her own focus on the
problem of “fragmentation and wholeness” (dualism and nondualism),
Freeman proceeds both linearly and proleptically, progressing linearly
through (more or less) two Nights per chapter, while discussing Night the
Ninth in all of her chapters along the way. In this manner, the nondualist
insights of Night the Ninth are made to appear as the eternal now, the background against which the temporal events of Night the First through Night
the Eighth are played.
Freeman's method certainly allows her to answer many questions that arise
in her movement through the poem, but is it really fair to try to move Night
the Ninth from the end to the center of the poem? Freeman understands the
apparently unfinished or “palimpsest-like state of the manuscript” to be
Blake's way of addressing the fragment-vs-wholeness set of contraries, and she
suggests that Blake was “‘keeping’ the poem, as one keeps a journal” (27). This
model is persuasive for understanding the repeated revisions laid atop and
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beside other versions or drafts; it suggests the sort of recursive model common in modern writing theory, in which composition is recognized to be
ongoing, and the author continues to revise earlier passages as she or he
comes to understand more about what comes later. But Freeman's notion of
“proleptic echoes,” for example, in the interpretive process also seems to
imply a similar sort of reader, not a reader who reads the poem as one reads
a journal, but readers who are willing to “keep” the poem, to read it through
to Night the Ninth, and then return to Nights the First through the Eighth,
commenting and revising in the margins with Night the Ninth now echoing
in their heads. This may or may not be a viable model for Blake's conception
of his contemporary readership, but it probably does describe the methods of
the serious modern student of Blake.
Still, Freeman does generate some valuable insights, some of which will
unsettle popular notions of Blake. For example, Freeman's account of nondualism has implications for one of Blake's most beloved lines, “Without
Contraries is no progression” (Marriage of Heaven and Hell 3, prose; Erdman
34). This line functions in Blake criticism as a sort of base to which we all
return to explain the dynamics of innocence and experience. In The Four Zoas,
however, Freeman says, “It becomes clear . . . that progress through contraries
is not inevitable historical reality but is rather a contraction of consciousness”
(123). Freeman is making a very nice pun on “contraction” as both shrinkage
and the bindings of a legal contract, but what is important here is her assertion that the progress of contraries simply continues the problem of dualism.
Contraries imply “otherness,” the separation necessary for identity; life without this “otherness” is exactly what Enitharmon and the Sons of Los fear in
the closing plates of Jerusalem, when Los tells them, “Fear not my Sons this
Waking Death, he is become One with me / Behold him here! We shall not
Die! we shall be united in Jesus” (93:18–19; Erdman 253). In Freeman's reading of The Four Zoas, the equivalent to this union with Jesus is the “nostos,” the
return of even the contraries to the home that is the unified consciousness.
Ironically, perceiving this unified consciousness behind the poem requires
that the reader separate Blake from his characters. In chapter 1 Freeman says
that in grappling with the narrative instability of The Four Zoas, “the key” is to
understand that “the characters' anxiety about this [narrative] instability
should not be confused with Blake's willful disorientation of traditional
narrative structure” (25). Freeman returns to this crucial distinction between
author and character in chapter 3 where she addresses “the problem of how
the authorial voice can be gleaned from the conflicting versions by these selfproclaimed authorities [the characters] of what had been, what is, and what
will be” (68). One way that she accomplishes this gleaning of the authorial
voice is to recognize the “highly polemical” context of the speeches of the various characters of the poem. Of a scene in Night the Seventh, for example,

148

Criticism Vol. 41 No. 1: Book Reviews

Freeman says, “Rather than seeing the Spectre as a mouthpiece for the author,
one can see his manipulation of Enitharmon's ‘memory’” (78). For most writers this would be a point hardly necessary to make, but with Blake there is
often a tendency to flatten his characters into “mouthpieces” and then to identify those mouthpieces with their author; consider how often Los's remark in
Jerusalem about “creat[ing] a system of my own” is uncritically pulled out of
context and offered as Blake's philosophy. Freeman insists that we recognize
the outline of Blake's manipulating consciousness behind the conflicting
accounts of the characters in The Four Zoas, and even behind the “de-authorized” narrative voice who cannot bring order to their conflicts.
Freeman returns to the distinction between author and characters near the
end of her argument, saying, “When one allows for the interplay of fallen and
redeemed moments as a means of deriving the authorial voice, however, one
sees that the characters are far from personae for Blake” (150). This recognition is important because it emphasizes the fact that the characters' different
accounts of the “historical moment of the fall that supposedly caused the contemporary chaos” are “fictions never authenticated by the authorial voice”
(154). Just as an “eternal present” is revealed once the characters “[surrender]
the desire for an irretrievable past” (154), so is the presiding consciousness of
William Blake revealed once the reader ceases to choose among the conflicting versions of fallen history.
R. Paul Yoder
University of Arkansas, Little Rock

Sweet Reason: Rhetoric and the Discourses of Modernity by Susan Wells. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1996. Pp. xii + 287. $18.95 paper.
From the opening pages of Sweet Reason: Rhetoric and the Discourses of
Modernity, in which she invokes Plato's treatment of love, madness, rhetoric,
and truth in the Phaedrus, Susan Wells grapples with problems of rationality
and desire in language that have occupied theorists of rhetoric from antiquity
to the present. But Sweet Reason is not a book about the history of rhetoric.
Rather, Wells is concerned with drawing on the rhetorical tradition in order
to construct a new rhetoric appropriate for reading desire and reason in the
discourses of modernity, the “texts of the sciences, the professions, of government and the academy.” The texts definitive of modernity are, as Wells
explains, “texts that we are only now learning to read” (3). Wells supports her
claim and so justifies her elaboration of a new rhetoric by pointing out the
persistent incommensurability between the material practice of language in
use and language as an “articulated system of reason.”
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Wells bridges the gap between the material and the ideational through a
rhetoric of intersubjectivity. In the first chapter of Sweet Reason, she lays out
her rhetoric of intersubjectivity, building on the link long important in literary theory between language and narration. The originality and significance of
Wells's book derives, however, from her introduction of the term “action” into
the language/narration pairing. With action, Wells introduces materiality.
Specifically, Wells draws on the work of Lacan as demonstrative of the link of
action with narration and as characteristic of the desire, pleasure, and power
of language in use. For the link of action with language that Wells characterizes as rationality, she turns to Habermas.
Habermas is useful to Wells in providing the insight that the rationality of
our language use is defined in action, through an intersubjective experience.
Yet Wells finds Habermas wanting in his inability to take full account of emotive investments in language use. Habermas falls victim to placing too much
emphasis on the intersubjective experience of language as rationality and so
his theory loses the possibility of explicating terms for personal investment in
an active use of texts. Rather than dismissing Habermas altogether, Wells balances his theories against the psychoanalytic insights of Lacan. Given
Habermas's constant and consistent disagreements with French poststructuralists, Wells's choice of synthesizing an intersubjective rhetoric out of elements drawn from both Habermas and Lacan at first seems counterproductive. But Wells has made her choices carefully. The point is not so much one
of finding a common ground between the two, or even of attempting a resolution of the debate that divides them, but to acknowledge the productive tensions that join Habermas and Lacan even as those tensions might drive them
away from each other. As she explains: “In reflecting on language, action, and
narration, I repeatedly encounter the limits of Habermas and Lacan. Such limits emerge as necessary implications of each theorist's initial, productive
choice. A refutation of Habermas or Lacan would be even less interesting than
a harmony between them: both theories are singular raids on the impossibly
complex discourses of modernity. Habermas's reduction of language to illocution and perlocution and Lacan's elision of propositional claims both have
their costs, but for a rhetorical analysis, their productive power is more
salient” (7). Throughout the remaining six chapters of Sweet Reason, Wells
demonstrates again and again, and across a wide variety of examples, the
salience of her intersubjective rhetorical analysis. What makes her rhetoric so
salient is that each of her applications of the theory is carefully argued and
well supported. She never suggests readings of any texts that are not adequately supported by her claims for the terms action, language, and narration.
Yet, though I appreciate the thoroughness of her arguments, I often found
myself longing for more consequential conclusions.
For example, chapters 2 and 3 discuss exemplars of modernity, scientific
and technical writing. In these chapters Wells describes the authorlessness of
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scientific writing and the teaching of voiceless writing in technical writing
pedagogy. These two chapters are best read together as documentations of
separate though related facets of the same problem in modern discourse, the
privileging of rhetorics that erase themselves in an attempt to represent the
truth objectively. In terms of her tripartite rhetoric of action, language, narration, scientific and technical texts, the people who produce them, and the
institutions that house them, remain unself-conscious of writing as action,
and only slightly more conscious of it as narration. In a subtle and provocative argument, Wells demonstrates that to learn to read the scientific and technical texts of modernity, we must at the very least learn to read them as narratives expressing desires and anticipating actions they never quite realize and
about which they are at best ambivalent. In chapter 3, Wells locates the denial
of agency and action in scientific writing in both the institutional expectations
we have of scientific and technical writing and in the pedagogical practices
that train our expectations. In making these claims, Wells demonstrates the
heuristic strength of her intersubjective rhetoric for reading the texts of
modernity. In summary conclusion to chapter 3, Wells explains that for technical and scientific discourse to become communicative action requires a pedagogy that reflects on “the kinds of subjects that technical texts require and
create, on their discontinuity with subjects that science constructs, and on the
forms of life that such a discontinuous and multiple subjectivity supports”
(108). The conclusion is certainly well grounded in her argument. Wells
anticipates, however, the response that such work may pay minimal returns.
She explains that reading the texts of modernity is necessarily mundane and
not heroic; it is the important work of understanding the intentionless emergence of actions from the production of the variety of everyday texts—directions, descriptions, protocols—that define our society.
Putting aside the desire for heroic conclusions, Wells provides forceful
readings of actions produced through emotional and rational investments in
the mundane texts of modernity, a government report and a college classroom. As with the chapters on scientific writing and the teaching of technical
writing, the chapters on the report and the classroom are best read together.
In chapter 5, Wells uses the terms of her intersubjective rhetoric to read the
MOVE Report, the official account of events that led Philadelphia city officials
in 1985 to firebomb a home in which members of a militant African American
group had barricaded themselves. The MOVE Report attempts to provide a
public account of decisions that led to the destruction of the home and the
death of all but two of the inhabitants. As such, the report elicits rational
investment in the act by narrating a common civic purpose to the events.
Through her discussion of the report and the events, Wells hints at the complex reasons why collective experience of the civic is so elusive in texts of
modernity. In part, “the report sponsors reflection but does not itself carry out
the labor of understanding, the work of constructing language that can open
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up the public sphere to disparate discourses, transparent to reason” (192). In
chapter 6, Wells describes her own attempts to take on the task of constructing a language that opens the public sphere to disparate discourses by discussing emotional investments in the texts of modernity. She recounts an awkward teaching moment, when a student in one of her courses took over a discussion, silencing the other members of the class and denouncing the indifference of institutional discourse to her own personal suffering. Wells is honest and evenhanded in her analysis of what happened and why. Here, Wells
shows how her intersubjective rhetoric can be used to make sense of the discourses of rationality and desire of both students and teachers.
Without offering simplistic solutions, Wells demonstrates through carefully crafted case studies the value of her productive elaboration of action, language, and narration. Wells's book is a contribution to contemporary debates
that scholars and students in English studies must read. Its close argumentation and careful conclusions challenge us to do the hard work of reading the
texts of modernity.
Richard Marback
Wayne State University

Listening to Their Voices: The Rhetorical Activities of Historical Women edited by
Molly Meijer Wertheimer. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press,
1997. Pp. 408. $49.95 cloth; $24.95 paper.
Through a variety of circumstances women have been excluded from the
history of rhetoric. Molly Meijer Wortheimer has attempted to examine
women's rhetorical history and the ways that women have affected traditional rhetorical theory from their positions of marginality. It is important to
reclaim the voices of these marginalized women because by doing so we
enrich our definitions of rhetoric and our understanding of rhetorical theory.
This text consists of eighteen essays that are thematically separated into five
sections. The first of these sections focuses on the patriarchal conditions that
historically rendered the voices of women silent. This includes Cheryl Glenn's
essay, “Locating Aspasia on the Rhetorical Map,” which focuses on Aspasia of
Miletus, a 5th century B.C.E. female Greek subject-ally, who was uncommonly brilliantly educated and by whose works men were educated. Aspasia was
one of the rare female intellectuals who was mentioned by her male counterparts. She colonized the patriarchal realm of intellectual activity, but her
colony was quickly (re)appropriated by men. Glenn argues that if we take
Aspasia's role in history into account, we acknowledge that history is not
neutral territory and we also acknowledge that Aspasia, and women like her,
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challenge the history of rhetoric in a way that has ramifications for past studies as well as for future research.
Part 2 is a sampler of rhetorical practices and includes essays that address
female rhetorical practices from Pharaonic Egypt to nineteenth-century black
women. In her essay, “Black Women on the Speaker's Platform (1832–1899),”
Shirley Wilson Logan argues that speaking of the rhetorical activities of
African American women in the nineteenth century can be equated to speaking of their advocacy for change. She focuses on the speeches of Sojourner
Truth, Frances Ellen Watkins Harper, and Maria Stewart in an attempt to show
how women used their rhetorical skills in the public realm to work at righting the wrongs they saw in society. These women did not write books and left
no written records but they did help to establish a tradition of political
activism among African American women. Logan surmises that these women
were the embodiment of their messages for social change.
The third part deals specifically with women's writing that was sanctioned
by religious beliefs and includes Julia Dietrich's essay, “The Visionary Rhetoric
of Hildegard of Bingen,” which analyzes the rhetorical activities of Hildegard,
an eleventh-century mystic and abbess who was a writer of visionary tracts,
morality plays, medical handbooks, and Latin hymns. Dietrich points out the
discrepancy between Hildegard's words and deeds. While she claimed that
women were weak individuals created to bear and nurture children, and
therefore unworthy of the priesthood, she fought, using her will and her
strong familial connections, to separate her group of nuns from the male
monastic foundation with which they had been associated. Through her
espousal of the traditional weakness and necessary submissiveness of women,
Hildegard created a rhetoric that allowed her to write with the authority of the
divine and to use her marginality as a source of credibility. According to
Dietrich, Hildegard shows us that innovation within the traditional patriarchal
realm was possible, even at the hand (and in the hand) of a woman. Hildegard
helped to make northern Europe accustomed to hearing women speak
authoritatively, and resuscitated the protest tradition through which the marginalized “Other” used her marginality as a platform from which to speak.
The fourth part of the text examines the strategies that women have used
to appropriate intellectual and educational territories previously held exclusively by men. Contained within this section is Nancy Weitz Miller's essay,
“Ethos, Authority, and Virtue for Seventeenth-Century Women Writers: The
Case of Bathsua Makin's An Essay to Revive the Antient Education of
Gentlewomen,” in which Miller considers Makin's authorial decision to write
anonymously under the persona of a man interested in his daughter's education. Miller claims that Makin makes moderate demands and justifies them in
a manner that would appeal to the self-interest of men. Specifically, Makin sets
forth the argument that educated women make better wives, helpmates, and
educators to their sons.
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The fifth and final thematic section of the text discusses a variety of revisions that women have made to their recently inherited rhetorical traditions.
This section includes Jane Donawerth's “Textbooks for New Audiences:
Women's Revisions of Rhetorical Theory at the Turn of the Century,” which
analyzes the theories of female rhetoricians who wrote textbooks at the turn
of the century in the United States. Through this analysis Donawerth attempts
to ascertain the effect that race, as well as gender, has on theory. She examines
the research of previous scholars and adds research of her own to compare
and contrast the writings of Gertrude Buck at the turn of the century, and
Hallie Quinn Brown and Mary Augusta Jordan in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries. Donawerth finds, through this investigation, that these
women wrote because there was a segment of the population that was not well
served by texts written by and for white men, that they experimented with
gendered pronouns, and that they relied more heavily on conversation as a
model for discourse and teaching than did their male counterparts.
The text is drawn together by Diana Helene Miller's essay, “The Future of
Feminist Rhetorical Criticism,” which details the accomplishments of feminist
critics and their use of feminist rhetorical criticism. Miller claims that as
recently as 1989 there was no such thing as feminist rhetorical criticism and
states that in relation to the dominant tradition, feminist criticism remains
marginalized as it has failed to radically raise any fundamental rhetorical concepts. She also outlines the continuing struggle to bring feminist criticism
from the margins to the center.
Wertheimer has edited a clear and concise history of the rhetorical tradition of women of the world. While some of the essays do not satisfy the claims
they set forth, they are interesting and informative on both a historical and
theoretical level.
Samantha Blackmon
Wayne State University

